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Abstract
We study oligopolistic competition in product markets where the firms’ quantity
decisions are delegated to managers. Some firms are commonly owned by shareholders
such as index funds whereas the other firms are owned by independent shareholders.
Under such an asymmetric ownership structure, the common owners have an incentive
to coordinate when designing the manager compensation schemes. This implicit col-
lusion induces a less aggressive output behavior by the coordinated firms and a more
aggressive behavior by the noncoordinated firms. The profits of the noncoordinated
firms are increasing in the number of coordinated firms. The profits of the coordinated
firms exceed the profits without coordination if at least 80 % of the firms are commonly
owned - an astonishing resemblance to the merger literature.
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1 Introduction
Fund companies such as Blackrock and Vanguard, or sovereign wealth funds such as
Norges Bank Investment Management hold shares of many public corporations, some
of them certainly being direct rivals in their relevant product and services markets.
This gives the common shareholders a clear incentive to cooperate or even collude. Of
course, the antitrust authorities take care that collusive behavior is prevented. However,
there are sophisticated possibilities for the firm owners to coordinate indirectly. One
such channel is the strategic compensation of the managers of the coordinated firms
(see, e.g., Schwalbe 2018). The common owners of public corporations usually have to
hire managers to run their firms. Managers, however, have their own objectives and
adjust their operational decisions to the incentive structure given by the compensation
contracts. This interrelation unavoidably implies that the compensation schemes oﬀered
by the firm owners strategically influence the managers’ output decisions and thus the
firm profits.
In the theory of industrial organization, the strategic eﬀects of the design of the
manager compensation schemes are analyzed with two-stage games where firm owners
simultaneously oﬀer performance-related compensation contracts in the first stage and
managers simultaneously decide on prices or quantities in the second stage. In these
models, the compensation contracts consist of a linear combination of fixed salaries
and performance-dependent payments. The latter, in turn, often are assumed to con-
sist of a weighted linear combination of firm profits on the one hand and revenues (or
equivalently sales) on the other hand (see, e.g. Vickers 1985, Sklivas 1987, and Fersht-
man and Judd 1987, 2006). Transferred into real-world terms, manager compensation
is determined by a firm’s size and profitability, a stylized fact with robust evidence (see,
e.g., Tröger and Walz 2019 for DAX firms). The managers maximize their performance-
dependent payments by choosing optimal prices or quantities. The main result of these
models is that, due to the strategic eﬀects, the incentives of the managers are biased.
In the mode of quantity (or better capacity) competition they decide to produce more
than the firm owners themselves would. The consequences are lower firm profits and
higher consumer surplus and social welfare.
The influence of the ownership structure on the competitive behavior of firms has
attracted a lot of interest in industrial economics. The competitive eﬀects of cross
holdings (single-owner firms may hold shares of rival firms) and joint ventures (set up
by firms held by diﬀerent groups of owners) have been dealt with for quite a time. For
example, Reynolds and Snapp (1986) and Breshnahan and Salop (1986) have identified
the incentives to mitigate competition in the cases of cross holdings and joint ventures,
respectively. More recently, the topic of common holdings (sometimes also referred to as
horizontal shareholdings) gained considerable attention in the analysis of the eﬀects of
large institutional investors. Given the increasing importance of equity funds (see, e.g.
Bogle 2016 and Azar and Schmalz 2017), it is hardly surprising that a growing empirical
literature on the topic has emerged. It is less the investment of one huge fund threatening
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to distort competition, but rather the fact that a number of diﬀerent investment firms
each own a noticeable part of diﬀerent firms operating in the same relevant market. The
primary goal of investment firms is to provide a simply structured and well diversified
investment product for their customers. The most striking example is an index fund.
When investing in a similar (or in case of index funds virtually the same) set of firms,
investment firms have an incentive to coordinate the behavior of their portfolio firms.
Even though investment firms might be competing for the investors’ capital, they have
no conflicting interest regarding the conduct of their portfolio firms. Therefore, they
share the same incentives when designing the manager compensation schemes. Schmalz
(2018) and Seldeslachts et al. (2017) show that these eﬀects are substantial, albeit
with diﬀerent importance across the markets. In particular, anti-competitive eﬀects are
shown to exist within the airline and banking industry (see, e.g. Azar et al. 2016 and
2018). The average share (until Dec. 2019) of investment firms in DAX firms amounts
to 42.0%. Even if we just include the five biggest shares of investment firms in the
respective index firms, their share adds up to 16.9% (for more detailed information
see table 1 in the appendix). There exists mixed evidence on the question of whether
executive compensation is actually structured to sharpen (see Kwon 2016) or to soften
competition (see Liang 2016 and Anton et al. 2018).
A theoretical study of the influence of common holdings on the managers’ compen-
sation schemes and hence on equilibrium market conduct and performance has been
presented by Neus and Stadler (2018). They consider a model of quantity competition
in a triopoly market with linear demand functions and asymmetric marginal costs of
the firms. The present paper aims to extend this analysis by considering an oligopoly
market, where m out of n firms are commonly held by institutional investors. This
leads to interesting new insights on their investment incentives. Questions such as how
does the number of coordinated firms in a market influence the manager compensation
schemes, the managers’ competitive behavior, the firms’ profits and finally the social
welfare are of special interest in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the game-theoretical
model. Section 3 relates the model to earlier contributions by considering some special
cases. Section 4 summarizes the results, shows some policy implications, and concludes
the paper.
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2 The Model
We assume a homogeneous product market with the linear demand function
p = α−Q ,
where α > 0 is a measure of market size and Q ≡ ∑ni=1 qi is the total amount
of production of n competing firms. The firms’ marginal production costs c (< α) are
assumed to be quantity-invariant and of equal size. This leads to the firms’ gross profits
pii = (α− c−Q)qi , i = 1, ..., n . (1)
Managers are awarded according to observable and irreversible contracts oﬀered by
the owners. We follow the tradition of Fershtman and Judd (1987, 2006) and assume
linear compensation contracts specifying the payments
si = fi + giψi , i = 1, ..., n .
fi denotes the fixed salary for the manager of firm i. gi > 0 serves as a weight
parameter which, in combination with fi, guarantees that the total payment si to each
manager is equal to a given market-specific payment s¯. ψi = (1 − κˆi)pii + κˆipiqi is
the performance-dependent payment as a weighted sum of the performance measures
profit pii and revenue piqi. This specification leads to the managers’ objective functions
ψi = pii + κˆicqi, where κˆi is the strategic contract parameter set by the owner of firm i.
Following Neus and Stadler (2018), we define the transformed parameters κi ≡ κˆic to
obtain the performance-dependent manager payments
ψi = (α− c−Q+ κi)qi , i = 1, ..., n . (2)
Manager delegation is modeled as a two-stage game, where owners simultaneously
oﬀer compensation contracts characterized by the (transformed) strategic variables κi
in the first stage and managers simultaneously choose the production quantities qi in
the second stage. Owners aim to maximize their firm profits pii or the common profits
of the group of coordinated firms, respectively, while the managers aim to maximize
the performance-dependent payments ψi.
In the second stage of the delegation game, the managers decide on the quantities
qi, given the contract parameters κi. The maximization of (2) with respect to quantities
leads to the first-order conditions
qi = α− c−Q+ κi , i = 1, ..., n . (3)
Summing up over all n firms in the market gives the total amount of production
Q =
n(α− c) +∑i κi
n+ 1
,
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the firms’ production levels
qi =
α− c+ nκi −
∑
j ̸=i κj
n+ 1
, i = 1, ..., n , (4)
and hence the gross profits
pii =
[α− c−∑i κi][α− c+ nκi −∑j ̸=i κj]
(n+ 1)2
, i = 1, ..., n . (5)
In the first stage of the game, since managers’ total payment si = s¯ is fixed, the
firm owners maximize their (gross) profits. Let us assume that m out of n firms are
commonly held by a couple of investment companies. Then, the (n −m) independent
firm owners (NC) maximize their profits (5) with respect to the contract parameters
κNC , whereas the shareholders of the m commonly owned firms (C) maximize the sum
of their profits
piC = (α− c−Q)
∑
i∈C
qi
with respect to the contract parameters κC . Due to symmetry within each of the two
groups, the first-order conditions consist of the system of m linear reaction functions
κC =
(n+ 1− 2m)[(α− c)− (n−m)κNC ]
2m(n+ 1−m)
of the coordinated firms and (n−m) linear reaction functions
κNC =
(n− 1)[(α− c)−mκC ]
n2 −mn+m+ 1
of the noncoordinated firms. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, where all
n first-order conditions simultaneously hold, the manager compensation schemes are
determined by the contract parameters
κC =
(n+ 1)(n+ 1− 2m)
Nm
(α− c)
and
κNC =
(n+ 1)(n− 1)
N
(α− c) > κC ,
where
N ≡ n3 + 2n2 + 3n+ 2−m(n+ 1)2 > 0 .
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Table 1 presents the values of the contract parameters of the coordinated (C) and
the noncoordinated (NC) firms for a standardized market size.
Table 1: Subgame perfect contract parameters (α− c = 1)
m
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
κNC∗ 1 ——— 0.2000 0.2000 0.1765 0.1538 0.1351
κC 2 - 0.2500 0.0000 0.0417 0.0500 0.0500
κNC ——— 0.3333 0.2500 0.2000 0.1667
κC 3 - 0.3333 - 0.0476 0.0000 0.0145
κNC ——— 0.4286 0.2857 0.2174
κC 4 - 0.3750 - 0.0625 - 0.0156
κNC ——— 0.5000 0.3125
κC 5 - 0.4000 - 0.0667
κNC ——— 0.5556
κC 6 - 0.4167
κNC ———
∗κNC(m = 1) = κC(m = 1)
The positive contract parameters κNC indicate compensation schemes which induce
managers to aggressively expand production. The contract parameters κC are strictly
smaller than the parameters κNC . Furthermore, if m > (n + 1)/2, they even take on
negative values inducing managers to inoﬀensively reduce production.
Given these strategic decisions of the owners, managers choose the quantities
qC =
(n+ 1)(n+ 1−m)
Nm
(α− c)
and
qNC =
(n+ 1)n
N
(α− c) > qC ,
leading to the total production level
Q = mqC + (n−m)qNC = (n+ 1)[(n−m)(n+ 1) + 1]
N
(α− c) .
Table 2 presents the quantities of the coordinated and noncoordinated firms.
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Table 2: Subgame perfect quantities (α− c = 1)
m
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
qNC∗ 1 ——— 0.4000 0.3000 0.2353 0.1923 0.1622
qC 2 0.2500 0.1667 0.1250 0.1000 0.0833
qNC ——— 0.5000 0.3333 0.2500 0.2000
qC 3 0.1667 0.0952 0.0714 0.0580
qNC ——— 0.5714 0.3571 0.2609
qC 4 0.1250 0.0625 0.0496
qNC ——— 0.6250 0.3750
qC 5 0.1000 0.0444
qNC ——— 0.6667
qC 6 0.0833
qNC ———
∗qNC(m = 1) = qC(m = 1)
Evidently, all production levels are monotonically decreasing in the number n of
firms in the market. Furthermore, the production levels qNC of the independent firms
are monotonically increasing in the number m of coordinated firms. The production
levels qC of the coordinated firms, however, vary in an interesting U-shaped relationship
with the number of coordinated firms. Starting with m = 2, the production levels are
decreasing at first and then increasing until the former level is reached again with all
firms being coordinated (m = n).
In the subgame perfect equilibrium, the owners of the coordinated firms realize the
gross profits
piC =
(n+ 1)2(n+ 1−m)
N2m
(α− c)2 ,
whereas the noncoordinated firms realize the profits
piNC =
(n+ 1)2n
N2
(α− c)2 > piC .
Table 3 presents the profits of the coordinated and noncoordinated firms.
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Table 3: Equilibrium firm profits (α− c = 1)
m
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
piNC∗ 1 ——— 0.0800 0.0300 0.0138 0.0074 0.0044
piC 2 0.1250 0.0278 0.0104 0.0050 0.0028
piNC ——— 0.0833 0.0278 0.0125 0.0067
piC 3 0.0833 0.0136 0.0051 0.0025
piNC ——— 0.0816 0.0255 0.0113
piC 4 0.0625 0.0078 0.0029
piNC ——— 0.0781 0.0234
piC 5 0.0500 0.0049
piNC ——— 0.0741
piC 6 0.0417
piNC ———
∗piNC(m = 1) = piC(m = 1)
It is evident that the profits of all firms are monotonically decreasing in the number n
of firms. Due to ∂N/∂m < 0, we can also conclude that the profits piNC of the firms held
by the independent owners are monotonically increasing in the numberm of coordinated
firms. However, a U-shaped relation exists between the number m of coordinated firms
and their profits piC . The impact of that number on the profits of the commonly held
firms depends on the owner structure. Starting at m = 1 (no coordination), the profits
decrease at first, but eventually at m = n−1 increase. If only a few firms are commonly
owned, there is a loss of profits. But if many firms are commonly owned, the profits
increase and become higher than the profits without coordination. Thus there is a clear
incentive of index funds to invest in as many firms as possible. In fact, it is the policy
of the competition authorities that prevents the investors from a complete coordination
with m = n.
The welfare in the market is defined as the sum of the producer surplus
Π = mpiC + (n−m)piNC = (n+ 1)
2[(n−m)(n+ 1) + 1]
N2
(α− c)2
and the consumer surplus
CS = (1/2)Q2 =
(n+ 1)2[(n−m)(n+ 1) + 1]2
2N2
(α− c)2 ,
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so that social welfare adds up to
W = Π+ CS =
(n+ 1)2[(n−m)(n+ 1) + 1][(n−m)(n+ 1) + 3]
2N2
(α− c)2 .
Table 4 presents the values of the social welfare.
Table 4: Equilibrium social welfare (α− c = 1)
m
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.3750 0.4800 0.4950 0.4983 0.4993 0.4996
2 ——— 0.3750 0.4861 0.4965 0.4987 0.4994
3 ——— 0.3750 0.4898 0.4974 0.4991
4 ——— 0.3750 0.4922 0.4980
5 ——— 0.3750 0.4938
6 ——— 0.3750
As expected, the welfare is increasing in the number n of firms in the market, but
decreasing in the number m of coordinated firms.
Of special interest for competition policy is the derived relationship between the
number m of coordinated firms and their profits. Figure 1 shows this relationship for
the case of n = 6 firms in the market. The intersection point between the profits
of the coordinated firms (piC(m)) and the corresponding profits without coordination
(piC(m = 1)) determines the critical threshold value of m, above which investors gain
from coordination via the manager compensation contract.
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Figure 1: Number of coordinated firms and their profits (n=6)
The relative profitability of coordination within a smaller or larger group of firms
results from the trade-oﬀ between two eﬀects: the internalization of competition within
the group of coordinated firms on the one hand and the loss of market share of the group
in total on the other. In a small group of coordinated firms, the latter eﬀect dominates
the former. However, the market share eﬀect becomes less important once the group
size exceeds some critical threshold level m0 which is endogenously determined.
There is an astonishing resemblance between our result and the well-known result
derived by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) in merger theory. They have shown
that at least 80% of the total number of firms in the market have to merge in order
to raise their common profit.1 Interestingly, we derive a corresponding condition, even
if the underlying equations are much more complex. Table 5 shows the endogenously
determined minimum number of coordinated firmsm0 and their minimum share (m0/n)
necessary to raise the common profits above the level without coordination (m = 1).
1This result is derived under the assumption that owners themselves decide on mergers. The condi-
tion for profitable mergers changes, if the merger decision is delegated to managers (see, e.g., Gonzales-
Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) and Ziss (2001)).
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Table 5: Minimum share of coordinated firms implying an increase in profits
n 2 3 4 5 6 · · · n → ∞
m0 2 3 4 4 5 · · · n− 1
m0/n 1 1 1 0.8 0.83 · · · (n− 1)/n
Figure 2 illustrates the relation between the number n of firms in the market and
the minimum share (m0/n) of coordinated firms necessary to raise the common profits.
Figure 2: Minimum share of coordinated firms implying an increase in profits
At least 80% of the firms need to be jointly coordinated via the manager compen-
sation schemes in order to be profitable for the firms involved. As in Salant, Switzer
and Reynolds (1983), this minimum occurs with n = 5 firms, where m = 4 out of those
coordinate their manager compensation.
3 Special Cases and Related Literature
The presented model is suﬃciently general to include some special solutions as they are
known from previous models. The extreme case of m = 1 is an important benchmark
solution because it describes the management compensation without coordination. This
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solution was derived by Fershtman and Judd (1987).2 In the first stage, the owners
choose the compensation parameters
κNC(m = 1) =
n− 1
n2 + 1
(α− c) ,
which reach a maximum when there are two or three firms in the market.3 With an
increasing number of rivals, the strategic interaction between the owners declines and
converges to zero when n approaches infinity. In the second stage, managers indepen-
dently choose the quantities
qNC(m = 1) =
n
n2 + 1
(α− c) .
The firm owners realize the gross firm profits
piNC(m = 1) =
n
(n2 + 1)2
(α− c)2 ,
and the social welfare amounts to
W (m = 1) =
n2(n2 + 2)
2(n2 + 1)2
(α− c)2 .
The opposite limit case of m = n reflects the other benchmark solution where the
index fund shareholders commonly own all the firms in the relevant market. In the first
stage, the owners choose the compensation parameters
κC(m = n) = − n− 1
2n
(α− c)2 ,
which indicate a sophisticated implicit collusion by giving their managers incen-
tives to reduce production in order to increase the firm profits. Accordingly, managers
independently choose the quantities
qC(m = n) =
1
2n
(α− c) ,
and firm owners realize the gross firm profits
piC(m = n) =
1
4n
(α− c)2 .
The social welfare amounts to
W (m = n) = (3/4) (α− c)2 .
2Note that these authors used the transformed weight parameters κFJ = 1− κ/c.
3Neglecting the integer problem, the maximum is reached at n = 1 +
√
2 ≈ 2.41.
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As we have shown, the firm profits do not monotonically increase in the number
of coordinated firms. Let us therefore consider the intermediate case of three firms
where two of them are commonly owned by index fund shareholders. This parameter
constellation n = 3 and m = 2 is a special case of the triopoly model of Neus and
Stadler (2018) when the degree of heterogeneity in the market approaches zero and
there are no diﬀerences between the firms’ marginal costs. The common owners of firms
1 and 2 choose the contract parameters
κC1,2 = 0 ,
whereas the independent owners of firm 3 choose
κNC3 = (1/3)(α− c) .
Accordingly, managers of the coordinated firms choose the quantities
qC1,2 = (1/6)(α− c)
so that the owners realize the gross firm profits
piC1,2 = (1/36)(α− c)2 .
The managers of the independent firm 3 choose quantities
qNC3 = (1/2)(α− c) > qC1,2
so that the owners realize the gross firm profits
piNC3 = (1/12)(α− c)2 > piC1,2 .
The social welfare amounts to
W = (35/72) (α− c)2 .
Neus and Stadler (2018) additionally consider the case of asymmetric production
costs and assume that index fund shareholders invest in the more eﬃcient and there-
fore bigger firms. This scenario oﬀers a further option for a reallocation of production
between the coordinated firms. Production quantities and firm profits will be moved
from the less eﬃcient firms to the more eﬃcient ones. Of course, this eﬀect leads to
higher profits of the coordinated firms as a whole and therefore additionally increases
the gains of coordination.
It would be interesting to combine the versions of Neus and Stadler (2018) and
the present one. However, the analysis of an oligopoly with more then three firms and
asymmetric production costs is no longer tractable. Therefore, the two papers should
be interpreted as complementary versions of the same theoretical approach. Further
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versions of this approach, dealing with diﬀerent degrees of heterogeneity and price
instead of quantity competition are left for future research.
Even being an interesting special case of an asymmetric ownership structure, that
version proves to be too restrictive for a thorough analysis of the incentive structure of
common holdings. The reason for this is that in the case of symmetry at least 80% of
the firms have to be commonly owned to provide gains from coordination for the index
funds. However, this threshold level of 80% indicates that in case of a triopoly only a
full coordination is profitable.
4 Summary and Policy Implications
In many markets, several firms are commonly owned by institutional investors like index
funds. Given such an asymmetric common-holding ownership structure, the index funds
have an incentive to coordinate in designing their manager compensation schemes.
This paper studied the consequences of such a coordination by considering a homo-
geneous oligopoly where m out of n firms are commonly owned by the same group of
institutional investors. We showed that the strategic design of the manager compensa-
tion contracts may act as a device for the firms to implicitly collude in a market.
The total output in the market is reduced by shareholder coordination such that it
is detrimental to consumer surplus and social welfare. Our results confirm the concerns
about coordination activities of index funds with common holdings. This coordination
behavior induces crucial implications with respect to reduced competition in the product
markets.
Therefore, our model has direct consequences for antitrust authorities and competi-
tion law. Recently, the German Monopolies Commission has expressed concerns about
competition-reducing eﬀects of increasing common holdings induced by institutional
investors (see Monopolkommission 2016, note S24). In the U.S., several legal scholars
have debated necessary amendments to antitrust law. Posner et al. (2017) suggest a
limitation of institutional investors’ ownership to either not more than 1 % of the total
size of a market or only one single firm per market. Funds committing to strict passivity
should be excepted from this rule. These recommendations are fully in line with the
results of our model. Elhauge (2016) pleads instead for a stricter case-by-case analysis
on the basis of the current law. Baker (2016) questions the operability of the latter
proposal.
In their critical discussion of the Posner et al. (2017) paper, Lambert and Sykuta
(2018) raise doubts on the validity of the empirical evidence on the (net) harmfulness
of common holdings when potential benefits are neglected, which may be seen in better
diversification and better corporate governance, resulting in a better investment per-
formance of private investors. Private gains, however, are “hardly a qualifying merger
eﬃciency but only an anticompetitive wealth transfer” (Scott Morten and Hovenkamp
2017, p. 2038).
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The relevance of common holdings for competition policy strongly suggests further
investigations of the topic. Due to the simple structure of our approach, a general-
ization to heterogeneous markets and a complementary analysis of the mode of price
competition should be possible.
Appendix
Table 1: Shares of Investment Managers
Share of the 5 biggest Share of all
Firm Investment Managers Investment Managers
SAP SE O.N. 12.02% 37.24%
LINDE PLC EO 0.001 22.65% 83.00%
ALLIANZ SE NA O.N. 15.89% 40.42%
SIEMENS AG NA O.N. 12.72% 30.81%
BAYER AG NA O.N. 16.87% 45.13%
BASF SE NA O.N. 15.23% 36.07%
ADIDAS AG NA O.N. 19.38% 46.90%
DT.TELEKOM AG NA 10.70% 25.42%
DAIMLER AG NA O.N. 20.69% 39.76%
MUENCH.RUECKVERS.VNA O.N. 14.41% 40.17%
DEUTSCHE POST AG NA O.N. 13.82% 34.35%
VOLKSWAGEN AG VZO O.N. 9.77% 29.29%
DEUTSCHE BOERSE NA O.N. 20.62% 60.84%
INFINEON TECH.AG NA O.N. 20.93% 52.24%
VONOVIA SE NA O.N. 23.83% 60.51%
BAY.MOTOREN WERKE AG ST 10.25% 24.42%
E.ON SE NA O.N. 22.79% 42.28%
FRESENIUS SE+CO.KGAA O.N. 17.00% 39.35%
HENKEL AG+CO.KGAA VZO 13.13% 35.16%
RWE AG ST O.N. 15.25% 36.41%
DEUTSCHE BANK AG NA O.N. 15.49% 34.51%
MERCK KGAA O.N. 13,65% 46.44%
FRESEN.MED.CARE KGAA O.N. 12.68% 33.14%
MTU AERO ENGINES AG 38.99% 74.95%
CONTINENTAL AG O.N. 11.41% 25.35%
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Share of the 5 biggest Share of all
Firm Investment Managers Investment Managers
WIRECARD AG 26.92% 59.48%
BEIERSDORF AG O.N. 5.02% 16.20%
HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG O.N. 18.20% 44.74%
LUFTHANSA AG VNA O.N. 15.14% 34.63%
COVESTRO AG O.N. 20.10% 51.80%
Mean 16.85% 42.03%
Median 15.37% 39.56%
SOURCE: Thomson Reuters Eikon (2020). Shareholders History Report.
Retrieved January 14, 2020 from https://eikon.thomsonreuters.com/index.html
Status of data: Dec. 2019.
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